

Message Text

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TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 214580

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF MBFR GUIDANCE IN NATO

REF: A. NATO 5249 B. STATE 211141

USNATO PLEASE ALSO PASS TO RESOR ON SEPT. 28

1. WE BELIEVE THAT AIR MANPOWER ISSUES WILL BE THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL OF THE TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED NOW, AND WILL REQUIRE THE MOST CAREFUL HANDLING. ACCORDINGLY, THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO TRANSMIT OUR THOUGHTS ON THIS SUBJECT FOR YOUR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR RESOR ON SEPTEMBER 28. OTHER TOPICS IN REF B CAN BE DISCUSSED ON THE BASIS OF THIS GUIDANCE AND INFORMATION ALREADY AT HAND; FURTHER GUIDANCE WILL BE SUPPLIED AS NECESSARY.

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2. WE AGREE WITH SUGGESTION IN REF A TO RAISE THE US PROPOSAL AT THE NAC LEVEL AT THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY ALL AT ONCE. IN DOING SO, MISSION SHOULD DRAW ON THESE POINTS:

3. THE US HAS CONSIDERED THE ROLE THAT AIR MANPOWER SHOULD PLAY IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NOTED THE:

A. AD HOC GROUP REQUEST THAT THE ROLE OF AIR MANPOWER BE EXAMINED.

B. SUBSEQUENT MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT ON AIR MANPOWER.

C. PAST SOVIET HINTS THAT INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER WOULD MAKE THE COMMON CEILING MORE ACCEPTABLE.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIES TO DEVELOP THE ISSUE OF AIR MANPOWER DURING THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS.

4. IN THE MBFR INFORMAL SESSIONS IN VIENNA TO DATE, THE DISCUSSIONS HAVE FOCUSED ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WITH A VIEW TO REACHING A TENTATIVE UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SUBJECT. THE ALLIES NOW GENERALLY AGREE THAT, IF THE EAST SHOULD REMAIN UNYIELDING AFTER SEVERAL MORE INFORMALS ON THIS SUBJECT, IT SHOULD BE TEMPORARILY SET ASIDE, AND WE SHOULD PROCEED TO DEVELOP THE ALLIANCE PROPOSAL IN OTHER AREAS.

5. AS RECOMMENDED BY THE AHG, THE NAC COULD INSTRUCT THE AHG TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A REVISED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. THIS COULD BE COMBINED WITH A RENEWED EFFORT TO DRAW THE EAST INTO A RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF NUMERICAL DATA. IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE INITIATIVES, THE US BELIEVES THE NAC SHOULD GIVE THE AHG THE AUTHORITY TO TELL THE EAST THE REVISED OVERALL NATO AND WARSAW PACT, AS WELL AS US AND SOVIET, GROUND FORCE TOTALS IF THE SITUATION CALLS
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FOR IT. EASTERN RESPONSES TO THESE ALLIED PRESENTATIONS ON GROUND FORCE DEFINITIONS AND DATA ARE LIKELY TO CENTER ON AIR ISSUES.

6. ACCORDINGLY, THE US WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE ALLIES CONSIDER THE APPROACHES ON AIR MANPOWER LISTED IN REFTTEL
B. THE NAC COULD INSTRUCT THE SPC TO EXPLORE THESE AIR MANPOWER APPROACHES WITH A VIEW TO PERMITTING THE AHG

TO BEGIN DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE ANY OR ALL OF THESE ACTIONS, ALONG WITH OUR ALLIES, IN VIENNA.

7. AS THE PRESENT DRAFT MBFR WORKING GROUP PAPER ON AIR MANPOWER POINTS OUT, ANY LIMITATIONS ON AIR MANPOWER COULD RESTRICT PACT AIR FORCE READINESS MORE THAN OUR OWN. IT MIGHT EVEN INTERFERE WITH THE CURRENT IMPROVEMENT OF PACT AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES THAT APPEARS

TO BE OCCURRING IN THE NGA. FOR THESE REASONS, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE UNDUE DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING THE FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AND ON THE DEMAND FOR ASYMMETRICAL CUTS.

8. THE US BELIEVES THAT IF THE ALLIES DEVELOP THEIR POSITION REGARDING AIR MANPOWER, THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE WILL THEREBY BE ADVANCED. THIS IS NOT MERELY A TACTICAL DEVICE. THE FUNDAMENTAL ALLIED GOAL-- THE NEED TO ACHIEVE AN OUTCOME TO MBFR WHICH WILL BE STABLE OVER THE LONG RUN--LOGICALLY IMPLIES TAKING ACCOUNT OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN SOME MANNER. AN AIR MANPOWER DISCUSSION WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR COUNTERING EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT DISPARITIES ARE AN ARTIFICIAL WESTERN CONCEPT DERIVED FROM A SELECTIVE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES ONLY. THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS ON EACH SIDE AND THE APPARENT COMBAT-HEAVY NATURE OF PACT AIR FORCES WILL PROVIDE AGREATER WEIGHT TO ALLIED ARGUMENTS.

9. WE INTEND TO SUBMIT PAPERS TO THE SPC TO CONTRIBUTE TO FULL AND EXPEDITIOUS ALLIED DISCUSSIONS ON AIR MANPOWER. WE HAVE NO FIXED TIME PERIOD FOR REQUIRED
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DECISIONS, BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO DISCUSS TIMING WITH AMBASSADOR RESOR DURING HIS BRUSSELS VISIT. IN TERMS OF ALLIED RECEPTIVITY, DECISIONS MIGHT BEST BE SOUGHT IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER:

1. INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN A NO-INCREASE AGREEMENT.
2. EXCHANGE OF AIR MANPOWER DATA.
3. INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER WITHIN A MANPOWER COMMON CEILING.
4. INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE DATA BASE FOR COMPUTING US AND SOVIET PHASE I GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

(THE SOVIETS MAINTAIN THAT THIS WOULD REDUCE MANPOWER
ASYMMETRIES.)

5. WITHDRAWING UP TO 15 PERCENT OF US AND SOVIET
AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I.

10. WE INFORMED VISITING FRG TEAM HEADED BY FOREIGN
OFFICE POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL (AND INCLUDING ROTH,
BRIG. GEN. SCHUHWIRTH, PFEFFER, RUTH AND LT. COL.
TANDECKI) OF FULL CONTENTS OF REF (B) EXCEPT FYI PORTION.
REACTION WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE, AND THERE WAS A

WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ALL POINTS SERIOUSLY. THEY
RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO ANY SUGGESTION OF INCLUDING
AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS--IN PART BECAUSE OF
PRECEDENT THIS WOULD SET FOR PHASE II--AND RECEPTIVELY
TO COVERING AIR MANPOWER IN NON-INCREASE AGREEMENT
AND TO STUDY WAYS TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN COMMON
CEILING. WE HAVE DISCUSSED SUBJECT BRIEFLY WITH UK EMB-
OFF, AND WILL HAVE FULLER CONSULTATION WITH UK
EMBASSY SEPT. 30. KISSINGER

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